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Preface
The fall in the housing market shows no sign of reversing itself.After hous-
ing prices rose by 19 percent from 1995 to the first quarter of 2000, and by
another 20 percent to the third quarter of 2005, we saw a stagnation and
then a fall in the market. More recently, housing received another blow, as
the subprime mortgage market began contracting in the face of rising
delinquencies and foreclosures, undercutting demand in the lower end of
the market. As I write, the major bond rating agencies have downgraded a
significant number of securities backed by mortgages. A large share of
homes have already been foreclosed and stand vacant in many communi-
ties around the country, even in some where the job market is relatively
strong.In our new Public Policy Brief,Greg Hannsgen,Gennaro Zezza,and
I look at the potential effects of the fall of the housing market on the econ-
omy as a whole.
As we point out, a decline in home values is likely to have two impor-
tant effects on consumer expenditures, according to economic theory.
First,people are poorer when their homes decline in value.Second,regard-
less of net worth, people who lack cash or other means of borrowing often
rely on home equity withdrawal (mostly loans,lines of credit,and cash-out
refinancings) to finance their purchases.In this brief,we report our econo-
metric estimates of the effect of the first-quarter drop in the market: a 0.9
percent fall in expenditures in the long run. Of course, other factors could
combine with the housing market collapse to reduce expenditures even
more. Our model cannot take into account certain important variables
such as bankruptcies of lenders and financial institutions, which may be
important in the coming months.
We next consider various financial developments that have occurred
since the last major fall in home values. These new and expanded markets6 Public Policy Brief, No. 90
and laxer lending practices may have an effect on the economy through
bankruptcies and foreclosures, along with concomitant falls in the value of
securities whose worth is closely tied to residential properties. Along with
the subprime market, other novel or until-now rare types of mortgages
have become important—those that require no down payments, allow the
principal to increase over time,or do not require proof of income,to name
a few examples—that pose no less of a threat to the financial system.
Economists’ theories about mortgage securitizations and derivatives and
subprime and “exotic”mortgages differ.In this brief,we argue for an inter-
pretation based on the work of the late Levy Institute scholar Hyman P.
Minsky, which emphasizes certain historical patterns in the growth and
collapse of various forms of credit.
We conclude with a brief discussion of policies designed to deal with
the crisis.Over the longer term,there is a need for a strong regulatory effort
to curtail the risky lending practices that contributed to the current crisis.
We also support federal and industry help for homeowners who risk losing
their homes. Congress and financial-institution regulators have shown
some interest in both of these responses.Also, we recommend two policies
that would be beneficial regardless of the state of the housing market:
maintaining Social Security benefit levels and inflation adjustments and
initiating a federal employer-of-last-resort program, which would help
some homeowners meet their financial commitments if they lost their reg-
ular jobs.To limit the scale and scope of the current crisis will require these
wider commitments, not just the belated reform of lending practices.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
July 2007Introduction
With economic growth having cooled to 0.7 percent in the first quarter of
2007, the economy can ill afford a slump in consumption by the American
household. But it now appears that the household sector could finally give
in to the pressures of rising gasoline prices,a weakening home market,and
a large debt burden. The signals are still mixed; for example, while the ISM
manufacturing index for June showed some improvement, retail sales
dropped sharply in that month. Consumption growth indicates a slow-
down. In this Public Policy Brief, we look at the American household and
its economic fortunes, concentrating on how falling home prices might
hamper economic growth,generate social dislocations,and possibly lead to
a full-blown financial crisis.
First,we review some facts about the U.S.real estate market and recent
financial developments. We then discuss and comment on methods used
by economists to gauge the economic impact of changes in housing wealth
and finance. Next, we step back and view recent developments in housing
finance and house values in the context of several broader theories of the
benefits and costs of financial innovations,in particular (following McCulley
2007), Hyman P. Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis, which we use as a
frame of reference for the current situation. Before concluding, we very
briefly discuss some policy options.
There are numerous signs that housing,an important part of the expan-
sion after the 2001 recession, has begun to cool off. The seasonally adjusted
real median price of existing homes—the proxy adopted for our evaluation
of the impact of the housing market on consumption—reveals a sharp turn-
around (Figure 1).1 After stabilizing for about 15 years, this measure rose by
19 percent from 1995 to the first quarter of 2000—when GDP growth started
to slow down—and by an additional 20 percent to the third quarter of 2005,
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when it reached its peak. In the first quarter of 2007, this index lost about 9
percent of its value, and the April 2007 figure shows a further decline.
The rising demand for homes had been driven largely by a steep rise in
subprime mortgages, which are made to borrowers with a relatively high
probability of default, many of whom would otherwise have been shut out
of the market. These loans grew fivefold between 2001 and 2005, reaching
$625 billion annually (The Economist 2006). They now account for 14 per-
cent of all mortgages outstanding, and have been used for home-equity
withdrawal, not just first-time home purchases (Bernanke 2007c). The
rapid growth of the subprime segment of the market took place along with
an increase in variable-rate mortgages and “exotic” mortgage products,
including loans that require no down payment or proof of income.Lenders
have justified lax lending standards with new,more sophisticated and auto-
mated methods for evaluating creditworthiness, but events are beginning
to bear out the dire forecasts of many pessimistic analysts. The rate of seri-
ous delinquencies—with payments at least 90 days late or with the loan in
foreclosure—has approximately doubled,to 12 percent,for subprime mort-
gages with adjustable interest rates, and difficulties have been spreading to
Figure 1 Index of Median Price of Existing Homes, Deflated
































1995q1Alt-A mortgages, which are less risky than subprime but still below prime
(Shenn 2007; Bernanke 2007b).Some securities backed by subprime mort-
gages have been downgraded by the major bond rating firms; a Bear Stearns
hedge fund holding billions of dollars in such securities narrowly averted a
meltdown in late June (Ng 2007; Howley 2007), and the banks that provide
capital to mortgage lenders have begun to demand tighter lending stan-
dards, more documentation of income, and more money down (Shenn
2007). This will curtail the demand for homes absolutely, probably leading
to further price declines. More problems lie around the corner, as many
variable-rate mortgages will be subject to upward interest rate adjustments
in the coming years, just as mortgage interest rates have finally begun to
rise in earnest. The average rate for a 30-year fixed mortgage rose over half
a percentage point over a five-week period beginning in early May,a rise that
would add $116 to the monthly payment on a $300,000 mortgage (Howley
2007).These adjustments alone will cause over one million foreclosures on
first mortgages originated in 2004–06, according to an industry study by
First American CoreLogic conducted before the recent rate increases (Cagan
2007). Homes lost to foreclosure will wind up in an already overcrowded
market, a development that will no doubt depress prices even more.
Any analysis of the subprime mortgage debacle would be incomplete
without a discussion of how its impact will be felt most strongly among cer-
tain demographic groups and neighborhoods. Minority borrowers have
been a leading market for subprime lenders,and they stand to lose the most
from the ongoing wave of foreclosures.The Wall Street Journal (Whitehouse
2007) and the New York Times (Eckholm 2007) have recently reported that
some neighborhoods and cities already have large numbers of vacant
homes. Cities must deal with the problem of maintaining these properties,
which can fall into disrepair and become havens for derelicts and criminals.
To an economist, idle resources like unoccupied buildings present some-
thing of a paradox,but few people want to move into a neighborhood with
boarded-up homes,and such homes can remain vacant and gradually dete-
riorate for decades. It would be incorrect to deny that the decay of entire
neighborhoods will have an impact on economic well-being or impose social
costs on cities,leaving aside the obvious effect of a loss of household assets.
Moreover,there will be a larger economic impact of concentrated hardship,
as opposed to hardship that is spread evenly throughout society: even if the
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 910 Public Policy Brief, No. 90
costs of foreclosures are low when considered as a percentage of total loans
or national GDP, that part of the population that is especially affected may
lose access to credit for some time.
Fed chief Ben Bernanke felt the issue was serious enough to devote
speeches to subprime mortgages in mid-May and early June (2007b,2007c).
He believes that recent curbs on subprime lending,along with an increase in
foreclosures,will reduce the demand for houses,putting downward pressure
on prices. However, he emphasized that the “vast majority of mortgages,
including even subprime mortgages, continue to perform well,” and that
problems with subprime mortgages were unlikely to spill over into the rest
of the economy or the financial system as a whole. He feels that regulators
have taken many steps to ensure responsible lending practices,although mar-
ket forces, especially transparency, are ultimately the most effective restraint
against excessive risk taking.An earlier speech called for action to shore up
the capital of the government-sponsored entities that invest in hundreds
of billions of dollars in mortgages and also bundle them into securities
(Bernanke 2007a). Remarkably, it seemed to hint that the current position
of these companies could lead to a major financial crisis.We revisit Bernanke’s
speeches and their cautiously optimistic view of recent financial develop-
ments below. But we turn next to an analysis of how adverse events in the
housing market might affect household consumption, and the economy
more generally.
The Impact of Housing Wealth and Home Equity 
Withdrawal on Economic Activity: What We Know 
and What We Will Find Out
It will come as no surprise to most readers that economists suspect that the
housing boom has been an important force behind the economic recovery
that began in 2002,and that an unstable housing market may now be lead-
ing the economy into a recession or an extended period of very weak growth
(Godley,Papadimitriou,and Zezza 2007).But here we provide some further
perspectives on the “housing wealth effect” and other related impacts on
consumption spending.
There are several ways in which housing is an integral part of a grow-
ing economy,especially in periods of rapidly rising home values.First,homeThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
building, furniture sales, and home improvements account for a large per-
centage of GDP.Government statistics show that the residential investment
sector is already acting as a drag on economic growth (Figure 2). Second,
rising home prices increase household net worth, and consumers probably
base their spending decisions partly on their net worth,not just their income
(Friedman 1957; Keynes 1936, pp. 92–93). It is important to distinguish the
two roles of home equity. First, along with financial assets and the dis-
counted value of future income, it is a component of what we call “perma-
nent income,” which in turn determines the total amount of overall
household consumption. Second, through its role as a piggy bank, home
equity can make consumption possible when consumers lack cash and have
no other way to borrow at a reasonable interest rate. Since the general
increase in the availability of mortgages extends to second mortgages,
home equity lines of credit, and the like, the “piggy-bank effect” has
become more potent in recent years. The importance of loans secured by
residential real estate had already increased when, in 1986, the tax-
deductibility of interest payments on other types of consumer loans used
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to purchase durable goods—automobiles, appliances, and so on—or
obtain cash was eliminated. Most studies of how housing wealth affects
consumption deal with this dual role—as both balance sheet item and a
source of cash. The theory on which these studies are based has well-
known flaws,but it is a reasonable starting point for a discussion,since it is
the basis of almost all academic and popular assessments of the effect of
housing on the economy.
The simplest method used by econometricians to estimate the impact of
housing wealth on consumption and other economic activity is to suppose a
linear relationship, in which economic activity is a function of other vari-
ables, including housing wealth and perhaps mortgage equity withdrawal
(the latter comprising mostly home equity loans and credit lines, and cash-
out refinancings).This allows one to measure the effect of a given increase in
home equity or home prices on economic activity when other variables are
held constant. Of course,“causality”is an important issue that must be dealt
with (Campbell and Cocco 2005; Aron and Muellbauer 2006). For example,
if one finds that a one-dollar increase in home equity is associated with 10
cents of additional consumption, it cannot be assumed that the increase in
home equity directly caused the increase in consumption. There may be
some third force driving both home values and consumption—for example,
expectations of future income increases or increased credit availability.There
are econometric ways of dealing with problems of causality (and the Levy
Institute macro model uses some of these),but some quoted estimates of the
magnitude of housing wealth effects do not incorporate such corrections,
and are essentially correlations or observations of ratios.2
In a useful summary of previous studies,Menegatti and Roubini (2007)
find that estimates of the propensity to consume out of an additional dol-
lar of housing wealth range from 4.5 to 16 cents and that each dollar of
home equity withdrawal leads to 10 to 50 cents of additional consumption
spending. We note that such estimates typically do not include home
improvements,which are thought to constitute a form of investment in the
home. But at a time of falling home prices, when such investments (say,
marble countertops installed in a home in a marginal neighborhood) are
probably not leading to appreciation,home improvements may in fact best
be considered a form of consumption. Also, like consumption expendi-
tures, home improvements stimulate employment, a boost to the economyThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
that will be partly lost if the home equity piggy bank is effectively taken
away. A related point is that home equity withdrawals used for paying off
other forms of debt are not technically considered consumption expendi-
tures. But when someone pays for a purchase with a credit card and later
pays off the credit card balance with a lower-interest home equity loan,that
loan has in effect financed the original purchase. When home improve-
ments and payoffs of nonmortgage debt are added to actual consumption
expenditures,the impact of a dollar of home equity withdrawal is multiplied
several times over (Greenspan and Kennedy 2007).Shiller (2004) argues that
there is strong evidence of a regional effect of rising or falling home prices
on consumption.
To be sure,there are a number of studies showing that the United States
has had other periods of regionally inflated housing prices but has not
experienced a national boom-bust episode (e.g., Bordo 2005). Aside from
choosing the appropriate measure of the effect of housing on consump-
tion,it is important to keep in mind the broader issue that estimates of the
marginal effect of one variable on another may not fully capture certain
synergies and positive feedbacks that come with any major recession or
financial crisis.For example,a weakening home market may prevent finan-
cially distressed households from refinancing their homes, which would
lead to foreclosures,which would in turn add supply to the market,pulling
prices down further.Add to the mix variables such as job losses,defaults in
other subprime credit markets, tightening standards for obtaining loans,
and bankruptcies of financial institutions, and one can concoct scenarios
that seem plausible but that cannot be understood simply in terms of an
econometric estimate of the marginal effect of one variable on another.No
one can be sure that such a scenario will occur or how serious it might be,
but the possibility is there.
Given the potential shortcomings of econometric estimates, we have
evaluated the impact of the housing market slowdown on the economy
using the Levy Institute macroeconometric model and some simple indica-
tors affecting domestic private expenditure.Our results are calculated in the
form of elasticities—the percentage increase in one variable for a 1 percent
increase in another variable.We find that the elasticity of real private expen-
diture to the median home price, at 0.04, is quite low during the quarter
when a shock to home prices hits, and rises to 0.12 when the shock is14 Public Policy Brief, No. 90
entirely absorbed, with a mean lag of about five months. According to our
estimates, the recent decline in home prices is slowly having its effects on
real private expenditure, and we expect these effects to persist in the second
and third quarters of this year. More importantly, a drop in home prices is
likely to reduce the willingness and ability of consumers to borrow, and
according to our estimates this will have additional effects on expenditure.
Our estimates imply a short-run elasticity of real expenditure to household
borrowing at 0.01, and a long-run elasticity of 0.03.
In the first quarter of 2007,home prices declined 3 percent over the pre-
vious quarter, and household borrowing dropped 15.6 percent. Combined,
the two effects imply a drop of about 0.9 percent in expenditure in the long
run,and about 0.4 percent by the second quarter of 2007.These effects can,
of course, be countered by positive shocks arising from real disposable
income or the equity market, but May data on real weekly earnings show
that wages have not been keeping up with inflation, and this will put fur-
ther pressure on household expenditure.
Although real consumption growth remained high in the first quarter
of 2007, at 4.2 percent, a growth-recession scenario, such as those outlined
in recent Levy Institute Strategic Analysis reports (Papadimitriou, Zezza,
and Hannsgen 2006; Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza 2007), is becoming
more and more likely.
Recent Financial Developments: Adding to, 
or Conjuring Away, Systemic Risk
Real estate crises have happened before in many countries, but two recent
developments in the way homes are financed will greatly affect how the cur-
rent situation plays out. First, financial institutions that originate mort-
gages often do not hold them on their books or bear the risk of a default.
Rather, an increasing number of mortgages are sold by their originators to
institutions that bundle them into mortgage-backed securities, which are
traded like any other bonds. The biggest players in this business are the so-
called government-sponsored entities, or GSEs (such as Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae), which have drawn the fire of Bernanke (2007a) and others.
These critics within the financial establishment and elsewhere argue that
GSEs enjoy an implicit government guarantee that allows them to pay lowThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
interest rates on the money they borrow. This arrangement amounts to a
subsidy by taxpayers,who may ultimately foot the bill for a bailout.Another
aspect of the “securitization” business is the resale of various “tranches”of
mortgage-backed securities, a practice that divvies up default risk among
investors who are yet another step removed from the actual lending process.
There also exist credit derivatives that simply obligate someone to insure
against default a certain bundle of mortgages held by someone else. The
result is that your pension fund may bear the risk of someone else failing
to pay the interest on their mortgage,while your spouse’s pension fund will
lose out if the same person fails to pay his or her principal. While it is
known that various institutional investors hold much of this risk, there is
no complete accounting of exactly who is exposed and to what extent,since
hedge funds and the like are not as heavily scrutinized by regulators as tra-
ditional financial intermediaries, such as banks.3 In what might be a sign
of things to come, Bear Stearns, one of the biggest investors in subprime
mortgages, has recently lent $3.2 billion to rescue one of its own hedge
funds that had large holdings in securities backed by subprime mortgages.
The second major development that will make this real estate collapse
different from those that came before is the greatly expanded use of sub-
prime and “exotic”mortgages and the general trend toward higher loan-to-
home-value ratios. Shiller argues that the new real estate crash could be
more severe than it was in 1990,“since this time the loan to value ratio is
much higher, and so the effects of the decline on defaults would be bigger”
(2004, p. 14). The term “exotic”simply refers to such risky practices as inter-
est rates that jump after a period in which the borrower enjoys a below-
market“teaser”rate; mortgages that allow the principal to grow for a time,
rather than being steadily paid off; zero down payments; and waivers of the
usual requirements to provide proof of income when applying for a loan.
The subprime business is simply the extension of credit to those who are
regarded as relatively poor credit risks; these mortgages carry higher inter-
est rates,and the people who grant them usually earn commensurately higher
commissions.The mortgage industry has steadfastly maintained that more
efficient, automated credit scoring makes these loans safe, but apparently
lenders are no longer sure of this, as they are rapidly eliminating some of
the newer lending practices (Shenn 2007; Bajaj 2007; Ng 2007). Some
investment bankers who provided the ultimate source of funding for many16 Public Policy Brief, No. 90
of these loans now deny that they were aware of the amount of risk being
taken on, and some lenders in turn say they would not have taken such
risks if the investment banks hadn’t pressured them to do so (Bajaj 2007).
Also, some lenders have apparently been using creative accounting tech-
niques to hide losses they have been incurring for some time (Browning
2007).All of these facts have been reported in the financial press,but those
in the industry who are using questionable lending criteria have so far been
a few steps ahead of the sheriff—the governmental bodies that have real
power to stop the most irresponsible practices. Moreover, some financial
practices that have hidden the extent of the problem—such as valuing illiq-
uid derivatives according to an optimistic model rather than market prices—
are legal and have been accepted for many years.We look at possible belated
responses from the authorities below.
The course of the housing crisis will depend on what has really been
going on,as a dizzying array of new financial products has become available.
We have offered a pessimistic view: lightly regulated lenders have been tak-
ing undue risk. Those who see a brighter picture acknowledge risks but see
mortgage developments as part of a market-driven flowering of innovations
that bring benefits to the economy and society (Rajan and Zingales 2003).
These optimists, who range from articulate, broad-brush advocates of free
markets to learned experts in academic economics,point to three key themes
in the rapid growth and development of modern financial markets and
banking: 1) a democratization that brings credit to those who lack “collateral
and connections”(Rajan and Zingales 2004); 2) increased choice of when to
spend lifetime income that sometimes arrives erratically or too late in life
(Hurst and Stafford 2004; Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen 2007); and 3) reduced
costs of borrowing due to increased efficiency of the lending process and the
spreading of risk to those most willing and able to bear it (Kroszner 2007).
Innovations in mortgage lending are believed to bring all three of these ben-
efits. Democratization occurs when increasing numbers of moderate-
income people of all races and ethnicities are enabled to obtain subprime
mortgages (Goolsbee 2007; Posner 2007; Becker 2007). Choice is expanded,
for example, when families with an unemployed adult are able to take out a
home equity loan to pay their bills until a job is found. The costs of lending
are reduced when modern software is used to reduce the costs of verifying
creditworthiness and grinding through mortgage-related paperwork.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
Another approach to recent financial developments, one that concen-
trates on the borrowers rather than the supply side, alleges irresponsible or
“infantile”behavior on the part of overextended and pampered consumers
(Barber 2007; Surowiecki 2007). Writers in this vein have argued that citi-
zens have become absorbed in the acquisition of material goods and/or
have knowingly taken on unmanageable loans.
Yet another way of looking at the recent explosion of new lending prac-
tices is more deeply skeptical than that of the free marketeers and techno-
cratic economists and more circumspect than that of the moral critics (for
this alternative view, see McCulley 2007; Minsky 1975, 1986; and Wolfson
1994).The financial and banking industries have undergone waves of inno-
vation since consumer credit became widely available early in the 20th cen-
tury. These waves have been spurred partly by the profit motive and the
need to outwit the regulators,and partly by the innate human tendencies of
greed, herd behavior, and overoptimism. Minsky’s financial fragility theory
(1975; 1986) showed how the economy is subject to one crisis after another,
as “Ponzi” and “speculative” finance repeatedly burgeon until an inevitable
and disastrous bust. Each time, the problem is caused by a new, apparently
failsafe investment—ranging from tulip bulbs to junk bonds—but the pat-
tern is the same.Supporting this interpretation is the fact that lending stan-
dards have been very lax relative to historical norms, and the ratio of home
prices to rents, compared to previous levels, is still high. Moreover, the use
of credit derivatives to shed risk associated with holding mortgages can be
seen as a kind of shell game—well known to Minsky—in which financial
firms evade regulatory control by introducing new financial instruments
and markets that, at least initially, escape the purview of the regulators.4
Seen in this way, the housing crisis takes on a different cast. Clearly,
there is some truth to the notion that credit has been democratized over the
years and that borrowers have more choices and enjoy easier terms.
Regarding the democratization, though, subprime borrowers do not bene-
fit when they take out loans that they simply cannot afford,while mortgage
bankers reap commissions and some company insiders exit with millions
of dollars in profits from timely stock sales (Ordower 2007). In particular,
recently originated subprime mortgages will probably result in a net
decrease in home ownership because there will be numerous foreclosures,
and because many subprime home loans are not used to finance first-time18 Public Policy Brief, No. 90
home purchases (Center for Responsible Lending 2007).As we have noted,
the social costs of foreclosures will be borne by the very people who have
apparently been the beneficiaries of democratization.
Turning to the argument that the widespread availability of loans con-
fers an increased ability to choose when to consume lifetime income (a
process known by economists as “consumption smoothing”), it is interest-
ing to note the diametrically opposed views of the market-oriented opti-
mists and the Minskyans. According to the optimists, modern, liberalized
finance and banking stabilize the economy by allowing people to borrow
during recessions to maintain consumption. Conversely, the Minskyan
view holds that the increasing availability of credit and proliferation of new
financial products represents the unsustainable upward phase of a poten-
tially unstable cycle. This may seem transparently accurate, at least with
regard to the most exotic lending practices. According to this view, when
the inevitable decline occurs, easy credit will no longer be around to cush-
ion the impact, and we will all be reminded that the cycle is a brutal real-
ity, and that financial innovations have both costs and benefits.
The Minskyan view not only belies the optimists’ story of the end of
financial history but also sheds light on the myopia of those who foresee a
decadent end of the world. Consumerism is nothing new, and while the
boundless quest for material goods undoubtedly draws attention away from
the world’s real problems and wreaks environmental havoc, human psychol-
ogy is such that people find it hard to turn down easy money. As mentioned
above, history is rife with examples, reminding us that we may be witnessing
one phase of a cycle that has repeated itself many times in the United States
alone since the 1960s (Wolfson 1994). Moreover, we have little empirical evi-
dence that home equity is withdrawn mainly to finance frivolous or luxurious
purchases. Finally, it is probable that many borrowers have simply been
deceived or confused by the fine print.(How many of us have been stuck with
a piece of faulty merchandise or failed to peruse the details of a disclaimer?)
All this is not to gainsay the role of individual responsibility and education,
which are always relevant in these episodes,or to say that loans are never used
for wasteful purposes, but simply to put this financial episode into perspec-
tive, as a single chapter in a very long historical narrative. This narrative also
shows that the solution lies partly in a regulatory response, not harsh bank-
ruptcy terms for irresponsible individuals, which would only delay recovery.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
What to Do Now
We have argued that the stage has been set for very serious and widespread
economic difficulties, which may have begun to unfold. Policymakers can-
not possibly forestall further declines in home values, save the more reck-
less mortgage lenders from bankruptcy, or bail out every overextended
household. Clearly, macroeconomic policy will be critical: if the Fed and
Congress can work to stop any incipient recession, they will prevent job
losses, which are one of the main contributors to foreclosures.An effective
job-creation method could be some form of employer-of-last-resort pro-
gram that offers government jobs to all workers who ask for them (Minsky
1986;Wray 1998;Papadimitriou 1999).Moreover,the Fed must be ready to
step in as a lender of last resort, should major financial institutions falter.
In the current situation, pension funds, with their vast direct and indirect
mortgage-related investments, may be as exposed to danger as banks. Pen-
sions are backed by a separate bailout fund (which at present is also in
jeopardy), not by bank regulators. The pension system is already failing
millions of retirees,and many pension funds are not financially sound even
now. Moreover, home ownership historically has been the most important
form of personal saving, but with the rise in home equity withdrawal and
declining home values,this may no longer be true.Social Security,long the
main source of income for older Americans of modest income, will be
more important than ever. Benefit increases may be politically infeasible,
but the system must be protected from ill-advised efforts to make cuts,
which would probably increase poverty (Papadimitriou and Wray 1999).
Congress has begun to hold hearings on possible remedies, and the
Fed is well aware of the need for action.Bernanke has stated that some new
regulatory efforts to stem abuses have been in the pipeline since 2006
(2007b). However, proposed rules focus narrowly on the mortgage prob-
lem. Bernanke supports efforts by nonprofit organizations and others to
help financially distressed homeowners renegotiate the terms of their loans
(2007c). Some members of Congress argue that federal dollars, matched
with contributions from financial firms, should be offered to help finance
such “workouts.” This approach would allow more families to stay in their
homes,though the majority could not be helped.Even if the terms of loans
are changed to help homeowners, payments will usually still be burden-
some, and foreclosure for some families will be families merely postponed.20 Public Policy Brief, No. 90
However, there may be no better option for many householders who can-
not afford their mortgages.
Bernanke remains supportive of a system that relies on transparency
rather than regulation,suggesting that the mortgage industry would not be
in trouble if it had been credibly warned years ago that it could not rely on
a government bailout. Strong opponents of regulation would go further,
claiming that the financial fallout from the current episode will deter fresh
abuses (Becker 2007; Posner 2007). But in the competitive and freewheel-
ing mortgage banking and hedge fund industries, the pressure to improve
the bottom line in the current quarter is very strong, even in the face of a
credible threat of devastating losses at some point in the future. Bankers
and others who lend money cannot be concerned with defaults that may
occur in a few years if they risk losing their jobs tomorrow. (Some of the
perils of this exposure have been discovered in the Bear Stearns hedge
funds.) Moreover, company insiders often profit handsomely, even when
their employers approach bankruptcy (for an example,see Ordower 2007).
The proposition that firms and investors rarely take on excessive risk with-
out the assurance of a government guarantee seems empirically dubious.
Whatever the future prospects for a transparent system that punishes
risky behavior,Congress,the administration,and regulators must now deal
as best they can with the failures of the past.In doing so they must be slaves
neither to an idealized view of the financial system nor to old ways of doing
business that seemed until recently to be working well.
Notes
1. In general,such indices can be misleading.For the home market,there
is no observation of a market-clearing vector of prices reached in an
auction market; rather, we observe a relatively small number of trans-
actions that leave many homes unsold. Hence, certain problems arise:
for example, those homeowners whose property values have declined
the most may be the most likely to resist an immediate sale, leading to
an upward bias in the index.
2. Partial correlations are sometimes used, allowing other variables to be
taken into account. But this technique does not eliminate the problem
of causality.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
3. See Chilcote (2006) for a detailed discussion of credit derivatives.
4. In one of his first articles (1957), Minsky, possibly under the influence
of his undergraduate mentors at the University of Chicago, developed
the notion that financial innovations could be used to circumvent reg-
ulation.In that article,he was concerned with the ways in which banks
skirted reserve requirements using new institutions such as the federal
funds market, but the general notion that banks outfox regulators by
staying one technological step ahead of them also applies to recent mort-
gage innovations. There is also a less sinister motive: simply to obtain
funds at the lowest possible interest rate.
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